Effects of Asymmetric Payoffs and Information Cost in Sequential Information Revelation Games by Yoon, Young-Ro
 
 
 
 
 
 
CAEPR Working Paper 
#2007-010 
 
 
 
Effects of Asymmetric Payoffs and Information 
Cost in Sequential Information Revelation 
Games 
 
Young-Ro Yoon  
Indiana University Bloomington 
 
June 19, 2007 
 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from the Social Science Research Network 
electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=995480. 
 
The Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research resides in the Department of Economics 
at Indiana University Bloomington.  CAEPR can be found on the Internet at: 
http://www.indiana.edu/~caepr. CAEPR can be reached via email at caepr@indiana.edu or 
via phone at 812-855-4050. 
 
©2007 by Young-Ro Yoon. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two 
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © 
notice, is given to the source. 
Eﬀects of Asymmetric Payoﬀs and Information Cost in Sequential
Information Revelation Games
Young-Ro Yoon1
Abstract
This paper explores the eﬀects of costly information and asymmetry in reward and penalty on
an agents strategic behavior in acquiring and revealing information. Whether information is costly
to acquire or not, in order to induce truthfulness in an agents action, the penalty should not be
stressed more than the reward to avoid herding or imitation. When the reward is greater than
the penalty, if information is not costly, for the relatively low quality of information, the agent
exhibits anti-herding. However, an equilibrium  in which she acts truthfully for all parameters of
information quality  can be induced by managing the reward and penalty. If information is costly,
within certain parameter sets of information quality, the agent exhibits deviation and imitation.
Also, for the moderate quality of information, the agent acquires her information although it is
costly and reveals it truthfully. The derived results can provide the reasoning behind agents
behavior trends in information revelation according to reputation and the diﬃculty of a given task.
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1 Introduction
The agents, who are in competitive environments, are frequently evaluated based on their perfor-
mance while fulÞlling their duties, and this evaluation in turn aﬀects their wages and promotions.
The agents accumulated evaluations then form the basis for their reputation in the market. While
the evaluation of the agents performance is aﬀected by many factors, the main factor is their per-
formance in relation to other competitors in the market. Therefore, if an agent is less successful
than her peers, even if she herself is successful, then she will be given a less positive evaluation than
her competitors. However, if she alone was successful in relation to the other agents, she will be
given a high evaluation. As a result of such an evaluation scheme, when carrying out a given task
each agent must consider not only her own performance, but also the performance of other agents
in the market. This presence of payoﬀ externality is the result of a competitive environment.
This situation is extremely applicable to agents working in the Þnancial sector, such as fund
managers or Þnancial analysts. The most important aspect of such jobs is the management of
information to which access is relatively limited. Due to the agents access to such restricted
information, the agents truthfulness in revealing this information is a key concern in the Þeld.
Much of the current literature address the question of agents truthfulness, and proposes that
the agents have an incentive to reveal distorted information. Herding and anti-herding are good
examples of the consequences of an agents dishonesty in revealing information.2
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) and Eﬃnger and Polborn (2001), for example, are representative
of the literature that deals with the topics of herding and anti-herding. The models used in these
studies commonly assume that two types of agents exist, the smart type and the dumb type. Both
of these types of agents work toward the same common goal. While involved in the completion of a
task, neither the evaluator (the market) nor the agent know which type of agent she is. Therefore,
during an evaluation, each agent strives to be evaluated as the smart type. In addition, it is assumed
that the smart type of agent observes the correlated signal, while the dumb type of agent observes
only the noisy signal. Thus, from the followers standpoint, taking the same action as the leader
attains the greater probability of being evaluated as the smart type. It can also minimize her risk
of being penalized by herself even if her actions lead to incorrect choices. Thus, herding is derived
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990). If, under similar assumptions, the concept of competition between
the agents is introduced into the model, then each agents main objective is to be evaluated as the
unique smart type, not simply as one of potentially several smart types. Therefore, if the value of
being evaluated as the unique smart type is suﬃciently larger than being evaluated as the smart
type, anti-herding can be derived (Eﬃnger and Polborn, 2001). In both models, the method by
which the market updates the agents type plays an important role in deriving the equilibrium.
Although the models described above eﬀectively describe the production of herding and anti-
2For literature which provides a theoretical model, see Avery and Chevalier (1999), Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani,
Hirshleifer and Welch (1992), Eﬃnger and Polborn (2001), Gale (1996), Levy (2004), Scharfstein and Stein (1990)
and Trueman (1994). In empirical studies, Clement and Tse (2005), De Bondt and Forbes (1999), Gallo, Granger and
Jeon (2002), Lamont (2002), Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000), and Welch (2000) Þnd evidence of herding. On the
other hand, Bernhardt, Campello and Kutsoati (2006), Chen and Jiang (2006), and Zitzewtiz (2001a) Þnd evidence
of anti-herding.
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herding, they fall short of describing real-world situations in two important areas. The primary
assumption of the above two models is that the agents main interest is to be evaluated as the
(unique) smart type of agent instead of taking the correct action. However, in real world situations,
it is also common to Þnd that an agents reputation is directly related to the outcome of her job. For
example, in addition to a base salary, many agents receive a performance-based bonus, which makes
up a large portion of the money that an individual earns. This bonus is detailed in her contract and,
therefore, the detailed agreement is composed in advance before the contract starts. Such a bonus
means that the agent, naturally, should give a great deal of weight to her performance during the
duration of the contract. A good performance will be closely related to having a good reputation in
the market and a continued good performance will aﬃrm such a reputation. In addition, a contract
generally contains clauses for both a reward for a successful result and a penalty for a disappointing
result in regard to the given task. Or, although it is not stated explicitly, an agent can interpret
the given payoﬀ structure subjectively as one biased toward either reward or penalty. Given these
real world conditions, it is important to asses how agents act strategically according to the given
or the subjectively interpreted payoﬀ structure when the payoﬀ directly depends on the correctness
of the agents actions.
Also, it is not diﬃcult to Þnd real world examples that demonstrate how costly it is to acquire
information. This cost may be especially pertinent for Þnancial analysts and fund managers because
the information acquisition process for these jobs is very expensive. If an agent must sacriÞce a
large amount of money, time or eﬀort in order to acquire information, then it would be rational for
her to not pay the cost and, instead, make use of existing information. In this way, the existence
of costly information can cause an agent to behave strategically during the process of information
acquisition. Thus, it will be essential to consider the process of both information acquisition and
revelation if the agents truthfulness in action is to be studied. However, much of current literature
assumes that information is given exogenously to the agent, and therefore it focuses on an agents
strategic behavior in revealing the given information in various environments. As a result, the
analysis of the agents strategic behavior in acquiring the information is not dealt with in depth.3
This article introduces a model that is distinct from the current literature in several regards.
First, we consider the case in which information is costly to acquire, and hence the acquisition
of information is endogenous and is subject to the agents strategic decision. Next, we explicitly
incorporate an asymmetry in the reward and penalty into the model. Also, we assume that agents
are homogenous in that the precision of their observed signals are same and that this precision
is public information. As a result, how the market forms and updates its belief about an agents
3Swank and Visser (2006) deals with the topic of endogenous information acquisition directly by introducing the
concept of costly information. As it follows the assumptions found in traditional reputational concern literature, their
models set-up and procedure are quite diﬀerent than those used in this model. In Swank and Visser (2006), the
equilibrium strategy depends on how much an agent cares about her reputation. In this model, on the other hand, the
equilibrium strategy depends on the quality of information and the asymmetry in reward and penalty. Also, in Swank
and Visser (2006), the critical value of information cost is described as a function of the markets prior belief that
an agent is a smart type of agent. In this model, however, it is described as functions of the reward and the penalty.
This allows this model to analyze the aﬀects of a change in the payoﬀ on the agents strategic behavior in acquiring
and revealing information. In this way, this model provides a complementary approach to the topic of endogenous
information acquisition by providing an analysis of diﬀerent aspects than those covered by extant literature.
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type does not need to be considered. Instead, we can focus on the direct eﬀects of asymmetry in
payoﬀs on agents strategic behaviors in a situation in which their payoﬀs depend only upon the
correctness of the agents actions.
The questions which we seek to answer in this article are as follows: 1) When information is
given for free, how does asymmetry in regard to the reward and penalty aﬀect an agents incentive
to acquire information and be truthful in revealing the information?, 2) If the information is costly
to acquire and an agent can make use of existing information, in what circumstances does she
choose to acquire her own costly information?, 3) If she does choose to acquire such information,
does she decide to reveal it truthfully? The results of these questions are summarized as follows.
In the case of the leader, she will always reveal her signal truthfully regardless of whether the
information was given exogenously to the follower. However, there are several variations in how the
follower may act. If the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the reward, the follower has an incentive
to act diﬀerently than the leader. On the other hand, if the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the
penalty, the follower has an incentive to avoid the worst case scenario, in which she is penalized by
herself and she therefore acts in the same manner as the leader. Particularly interesting is the fact
that the followers best response shows an asymmetric feature although the given condition of the
payoﬀ structure is symmetric, i.e., γ > φ and γ < φ where γ denotes the reward and φ denotes the
penalty.
Consider the situation in which information is given exogenously even to the follower. If the
penalty is greater than the reward, the follower will take the same action as the leader for all
parameter sets of information quality. That is, she exhibits herding if there is a conßict between
her information and the leaders inferred information. If, however, the reward is greater than the
penalty, the followers best response varies according to the quality of information. Under such
a payoﬀ structure, the follower has an incentive to be diﬀerentiated from the leader by acting
diﬀerently. However, since the reward can only be earned if her action is correct, then the quality
of information aﬀects her strategic behavior: if the information quality is relatively low, she has
little faith in the correctness of the given information, and therefore always takes a diﬀerent action
than the leader; that is, she exhibits anti-herding even though her information is the same as
what she infers the leaders information to be. Contrarily, if the information quality is relatively
high, she believes that the information is more likely to be correct, and therefore reveals her signal
truthfully; that is, although her information is not same as the inferred leaders information, she
does not exhibit herding.
Next, suppose that it is costly for the follower to observe her own signal. As the follower can infer
the leaders true signal perfectly, her decision becomes whether to acquire the costly information
or make use of existing information correlated with the true state. According to the results, there
exists a critical value of information cost above which the follower gives up observing her costly
signal. Even when the information cost is less than this critical value, her decision to acquire the
costly information is still aﬀected by the quality of information. If the quality of information is
suﬃciently high or low, she makes use of the inferred leaders information without acquiring her
own costly information. Extreme information quality, whether high or low, is a strong indicator
of the possibility that the leaders information is correct or incorrect. This causes the follower
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to consider not acquiring her own costly signal. However, if the information quality is neither
high nor low, then the follower observes her signal even though it is costly to acquire, because
the quality of information does not strongly signal as to whether the leaders information will be
correct. Moreover, if an agent does acquire costly information, then the strategic distortions of
information, herding or anti-herding, do not occur and instead the agent reveals her information
truthfully. This is quite intuitive. As the information is costly to acquire, if she had any incentive
to disregard her observed signal, she would have no reason to observe it at the expense of a high
cost.
These results provide an interesting argument that low or high quality information can be
socially good or bad. When the payoﬀ structure is strongly biased toward the reward, if the quality
of information is relatively low, an agent always takes an action diﬀerent from that of the other
agent. Hence, the eﬃcient case, in which one agent is correct and the other agent is wrong, is
derived endogenously. Yet, when information is costly to acquire, if the quality of information
is suﬃciently high then the eﬃcient outcome cannot be derived at all because an agent exhibits
herding or imitation. In a similar logic, if the payoﬀ structure is weakly biased toward the reward,
rather than strongly biased, a relatively low quality of information is socially bad.
The above results provide the reasoning behind the results of some empirical studies that discuss
an agents strategic behavior with regard to her reputation and the diﬃculty of the given task. The
key intuition is as follows. If an agent has a good reputation or if the given task is evaluated as
an easy task, an agent would have a great deal to lose from a wrong action and very little to gain
from a correct action. If, on the other hand, the agent does not have a good reputation, or if the
given task is evaluated as a hard task, an agent would have much to gain from a correct action
and relatively little to lose from a wrong action. Therefore, the Þrst case will correspond to one in
which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the penalty and the second case will correspond to a
situation in which the payoﬀ is biased toward the reward. Section 5 details how the results derived
in this model can be used to explain the Þndings of some previous studies.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 explains the model used during this
study. Section 3 focuses on a case in which the information is not costly to either player, while
Section 4 focuses on a case in which the information is costly for the follower to acquire. Section 5
discusses the application of the results. Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.
2 Model
There are two players A and B, i ∈ {A,B}, whose jobs are to provide forecasts about the unknown
true state w ∈ {H,L} which are mutually exclusive. To both players, the prior probability of each
state is Pr(w = H) = Pr(w = L) = 12 . Before making a forecast, each player has a chance to
observe her own signal θi ∈ Θ = {h, l} which is correlated with the true state. If θi is observed,
the draws of their signals are conditionally independent given the true state. Also, as θi is private
information, each player does not know which signal is observed by the other.
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The signal θi partially reveals information about the true state in the following way:
Pr(θi = w|w) = pi and Pr(θi 6= w|w) = 1− pi
where pi ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. Here, pi measures the precision of player is signal θi, so can be interpreted as
is information quality. As pi approaches 12 , it indicates that θi is becoming less informative and as
it approaches 1, it means that θi is becoming more informative about the true state. Throughout
this paper, we assume that both players are homogenous in that pA = pB = p, which is public
information.
Player i0s action, which denotes a forecast about the true state, is denoted by ai ∈ Ψi = {h, l}
where ai = h (ai = l) means that i0s forecast is w = H (w = L). The ordering of both players
actions is decided exogenously. Without loss of generality, we assume that A is the leader and B
is the follower. In these sequential actions, B has a chance to observe As action before taking her
own action aB.
Each players payoﬀ is deÞned by:
πA (aA, aB) = úπA (aA, aB) and πB (aA, aB) = úπB (aA, aB)− c
where c ≥ 0. In a model, we assume that θA is always given exogenously to A. On the other
hand, for B, we consider both cases in which θB is given exogenously and the acquisition of θB
is endogenous. If c = 0, it denotes the case in which θB is given exogenously to B. If c > 0, it
denotes the case in which θB is costly to acquire and c should be paid in order to observe θB.
Hence, if B observes θB, her net payoﬀ is πB (aA, aB) = úπB (aA, aB) − c and if she does not, it is
πB (aA, aB) = úπB (aA, aB).
Player is gross payoﬀ úπi is deÞned by the following payoﬀ matrix where γ > 1, φ > 1, and
γ 6= φ.
w aB = w aB 6= w
aA = w 1, 1 γ,−φ
aA 6= w −φ, γ −1,−1
(P)
This payoﬀ structure is designed in order to incorporate the competitive environment of two players.
Suppose that both players act identically. Then, if their actions reveal the true state correctly, both
players earn +1 and if not, both earn −1. On the other hand, if both players take diﬀerent actions,
the player who takes the correct action gets γ > 1 and the other player who takes a wrong action
gets −φ < −1. In other words, if an agents action turns out to be correct (wrong), the other
agents same action causes the negative (positive) externality because 1 < γ (−φ < −1). However,
as whether ai = w or ai 6= w cannot be veriÞed in advance, uncertainty is embedded within the
system. Also, note that we assume that γ 6= φ. Hence, our case is either γ > φ or γ < φ where the
Þrst (second) denotes the case in which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the reward (penalty).
Through this approach, we can analyze the eﬀects of asymmetry in reward and penalty on each
players strategic behavior in information acquisition and revelation.
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Consider now each players strategy. In the case of A, θA is always given for free. Hence, As pure
strategy is sA : Θ −→ ΨA where Θ = {h, l} and ΨA = {h, l}. That is, for given θA, A should decide
whether to reveal it truthfully or not. For B, if θB is given exogenously to her, sB : Θ×ΨA −→ ΨB
where Θ = {h, l} and Ψi = {h, l} for i ∈ {A,B} as she has a chance to observe aA before she takes
her own action. On the other hand, if the acquisition of θB is endogenous, whether to acquire θB
while paying a cost or not is also Bs decision problem. So, sB : ΨA −→ ΞB×ΨB where Ψi = {h, l}
and ΞB = {Observe θB paying c, Dont observe θB}.
The equilibrium concept used is the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note that, as θA is
private information, whether θA = aA or θA 6= aA cannot be veriÞed. Let λ be Bs belief that A
reveals θA truthfully. Then, the strategy proÞle s = {sA, sB} and λ constitute a Perfect Bayesian
Nash equilibrium if each players expected payoﬀs are maximized for a given λ, the other Þrms
strategy, and especially if λ is consistent with sA in terms of Bayesian updating.
Finally, below are the deÞnitions used throughout this paper.
DeÞnition 1 Truthful action: When player i observes her signal θi, if ai = θi, we say that
i0s action is truthful.
DeÞnition 2 Herding: Suppose player i observes her signal θi. When θi 6= θ−i, if ai =
θ−i 6= θi, we say that i exhibits herding.
DeÞnition 3 Anti-herding: Suppose player i observes her signal θi.When θi = θ−i, if
ai 6= θi, we say that i exhibits anti-herding.
DeÞnition 4 Imitation & Deviation from the other players action: When player i does
not observe θi, if ai = a−i ( ai 6= a−i), we say that i imitates (deviates from) player −is action.
3 Bench mark case: when c = 0
As a bench mark, we consider the case in which c is given for free to both players, i.e. c = 0. In
this case, the timing of the game can be represented as follows:
T1) Nature decides the true state w. The payoﬀ structure (P) and p are announced.
T2) A observes θA. Then, she takes an action after deciding whether to reveal θA truthfully or
not.
T3) B observes θB and aA. Then, she takes an action after deciding whether to reveal θB
truthfully or not.
T4) True state w is revealed and each player earns her payoﬀ.
Now, each players expected payoﬀ can be represented as:
EπA =
X
θB∈{h,l}
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w, θB| θA)πA (aA, aB) (1)
EπB =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θA, θB)πA (aA, aB) (2)
7
Here, it should be noted that As posterior belief should be about the true state and Bs signal,
i.e., Pr(w, θB| θA) because A has no chance to observe aB and infer θB. In the case of B, as θB is
given exogenously and she has a chance to infer θA from observing aA, the posterior belief should
be Pr(w| θA, θB). Here, θA denotes the inferred As signal, not the true As signal θA. As θA is
private information, although B has a chance to observe aA, the inference of θA depends on Bs
belief on the truthfulness of As action. Hence, it can be either θA = θA or θA 6= θA.4
Then, the analysis yields that the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium thus can be characterized
as follows.
Proposition 1
Consider the case where θi is given exogenously to both players, i,e, c = 0.
1) Suppose γ > φ. Then, A always reveals her signal truthfully. In the case of B , there exists a
critical value p∗ ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ such that if p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ , she acts diﬀerently from i (that is, she exhibits
anti-herding when θB = aA) and if p ∈ (p∗, 1) , she reveals her signal truthfully.
2) Suppose γ < φ. Then, A reveals her signal truthfully and B always acts identically to A (that
is, she exhibits herding when θB 6= aA).
Here, p∗ = 1γ−φ
¡
(γ + 1)−√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢
Proof of Proposition 1
In the appendix.
According to Proposition 1, A always reveals her signal θA truthfully. Note that B can observe
As action before she takes her own action. Hence, As truthfulness in action means that B can
infer θA perfectly from observing aA. In addition, this means that B assigns zero probability to the
possibility that A deviates from her signal. However, Bs best response in the subgame depends on
the asymmetry in the reward and the penalty and the information quality as follows.
First, suppose that the reward is greater than the penalty, i.e., γ > φ. In order to earn γ, B
should consider both taking the correct action and being the only one who does so. For example,
if aB = aA, although Bs actions turns out to be correct, her payoﬀ is +1 < γ. Hence, B has
an incentive to be diﬀerentiated from A by taking a diﬀerent action. However, always taking a
diﬀerent action from A cannot be optimal. For example, if it turns out that aB 6= w, then Bs
payoﬀ is −φ < −1, which is the worst case. Hence, B should balance both incentives, the one
to be diﬀerentiated and the one to take the correct action. The information quality p plays an
important role and this is why B uses the cut-oﬀ strategy according to her information quality
as described below. If the information quality is relatively low, i.e., p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ , B always takes
a diﬀerent action from A. That is, although θB = θA, she exhibits anti-herding. Although both
players observe the same signal, B has a weak belief in the correctness of the given signal. So,
the incentive to be diﬀerentiated increases her incentive to take a diﬀerent action from A, which
yields anti-herding. On the other hand, suppose that the information quality is relatively high, i.e.,
4However, it is shown that, in equilibrium, As best response is to reveal her signal truthfully, which should be
consistent with Bs belief. Hence, in equilibrium, θA = θA.
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p ∈ (p∗, 1). Although B still has an incentive to be diﬀerentiated, she has a relatively strong belief
in the correctness of the given signal, due to the relatively high quality of information. Hence, the
incentive to be diﬀerentiated is dominated and she reveals her signal truthfully.
Second, suppose that the penalty is greater than the reward, i.e., γ < φ. Then, B always takes
the same action as A. That is, although θB 6= θA, she ignores her signal and exhibits herding. If
γ < φ, B should be concerned about the possibility that she alone can be penalized. Hence, B
always takes the same action as A without regard to the information quality. By acting in such a
manner, she can prevent the worst case scenario, in which she gets −φ although it turns out that
w 6= aB.
In the current literature, it is already proposed that, when agents types are not known, if the
reward is stressed, then the agent has an incentive to be diﬀerentiated, which yields anti-herding.
Also, it is proposed that if the penalty is stressed, the agent has an incentive to blame a sharing,
which yields herding. In addition to informing the extant literature, this model provides the uniÞed
model through which both herding and anti-herding are derived according to asymmetry in reward
and penalty when the agents types are known. Moreover, interestingly, it shows that an agent who
acts as the follower reacts asymmetrically although the given condition of the payoﬀ structure is
symmetric, i.e., γ > φ and γ < φ. That is, compared to her extreme reaction, which is to exhibit
herding for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢, when γ < φ, if the reward is stressed more than the reward, i.e., γ > φ,
she exhibits anti-herding only if p is relatively low.
4 Extension: when c > 0
In this section, we extend the model into the case in which the follower B should pay the information
cost in order to observe her own signal. That is, whether to observe θB or not is B s decision
problem. However, we still assume that A can access to θA for free. If B considers observing
her costly signal, she must also decide whether to reveal θB truthfully or not. If B considers not
observing her signal, she should decide whether to imitate or deviate from As action. Below, it is
shown that As best response is always to reveal θA truthfully. Thus, our problem can be identiÞed
as one in which B makes a strategic decision about whether to acquire the costly information and
be truthful in revealing it when she can make use of existing information correlated with the true
state.
The timing of the game of this case can be represented as follows.
T1) Nature decides the true state w. Also, the payoﬀ structure (P), the quality of information
p and the information cost c are announced.
T2) A observes θA. Then, she acts after deciding whether to reveal θA truthfully or not.
T3) B observes aB. Then, she makes a decision whether to observe her costly signal θB or not.
If she observes θB, she also decides whether to reveal it truthfully or not. If she decides not to
observe her signal, she decides whether to imitate or deviate from aA. Then, she acts.
T4) The true state w is revealed and each player earns the payoﬀ.
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In the case of A, she has no chance to observe whether B will observe the costly signal θB or not.
Hence, As expected payoﬀ should diﬀer according to As expectation about Bs strategic decision
on observing the costly signal θB. If A expects that B will observe θB,
EπA =
X
θB∈{h,l}
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w, θB| θA)πA (aA, aB) (3)
On the other hand, if A expects that B will not observe θB,
EπA =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θA)πA (aA, aB) (4)
Using (3) and (4), A decides whether to reveal her signal θA truthfully or not.
In the case of B, she does not know which signal will be observed although she decides to observe
θB. Hence, Bs expected payoﬀ when she observes θB is
EπB =
X
θB∈{h,l}
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w, θB| θA)πA (aA, aB)− c (5)
Here, if she considers observing θB, it should be decided in advance whether she will reveal θB
truthfully or not for given θA. Bs this decision can be anticipated by comparing the following
expected payoﬀsX
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θA, θB)πA (aA, aB = θB)− c ≷
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θA, θB)πA (aA, aB 6= θB)− c (6)
for both cases where θB = θA or θB 6= θA. After deriving the best response for each case from (6),
then B computes (5). On the other hand, if she decides not to observe θB, her expected payoﬀ is
EπB =
X
w∈{H,L}
Pr(w| θA)πA (aA, aB) (7)
Bs decision whether to observe the costly signal θB or not is Þnally derived from the comparison of
(5) and (7). As explained before, in (5), (6), and (7), θA denotes the inferred As signal according
to Bs belief in the truthfulness of As action. The detailed procedure is provided in the proof of
Proposition 2 and 3.
Then, the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 2
Suppose that γ > φ and θB is costly to acquire, i.e. c > 0.
1) A reveals her signal truthfully for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
2) In the case of B,
2-1) Suppose c > c∗. If p ∈
³
1
2 ,
1+γ
2+γ+φ
´
, B deviates from As action without observing her
signal and if p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
, she imitates As action without observing her signal.
2-2) Suppose 0 < c < c∗. If p ∈ ¡12 , ÿp¢ , B deviates from As action without observing her signal,
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if p ∈ (ÿp, p) , she observes her costly signal and reveals it truthfully, and if p ∈ (p, 1) , she imitates
As action without observing her signal.
Here, c∗ = (φ+1)(γ−φ)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
, ÿp = ÿp (γ, φ, c) and p = p (γ, φ, c).5
Proposition 3
Suppose that γ < φ and θB is costly to acquire, i.e. c > 0.
1) A reveals her signal truthfully for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
2) B imitates As action without observing her signal for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
In the appendix.
First, consider the case where γ > φ. For the simple notation, d denotes Bs strategy to
deviate from As action without observing θB, m denotes Bs strategy to imitate As action without
observing θB, s denotes Bs strategy to observe θB and reveal it truthfully and σB denotes Bs
strategy.
If c > c∗, σB ∈ {d, m}. This case corresponds to one where the expected gain of observing the
costly signal is dominated by the suﬃciently high information cost. Hence, B makes use of existing
information θA. Whether she imitates or deviates from aA depends on the quality of information.
If it is relatively high, i.e., p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
, σB = m and if not, i.e., p ∈
³
1
2 ,
1+γ
2+γ+φ
´
, σB = d.
The relatively high p means that θA has a high probability of being correct. Thus, σB = m. On
the other hand, a relatively low p implies that θA has a high probability of being incorrect. Thus,
σB = d.
If 0 < c < c∗, σB ∈ {d, s,m}. If the information quality is suﬃciently high (low), B has a
strong belief that θA = w (θA 6= w) with a high probability. Thus, although the information cost
is not suﬃciently high, the expected net gain of observing θB is less than the expected payoﬀ of
making use of existing information. Hence, σB = m (σB = d). That is, if the information quality
is extreme, it signals strongly whether θA can be correct or wrong. Hence, compared to observing
the costly signal θB, making use of θA attains the greater expected payoﬀ. Meanwhile, if the
information quality is intermediate, i.e., p ∈ (ÿp, p) , it does not signal strongly whether θA = w or
θA 6= w. Hence, the expected net gain of observing θB is greater than the expected payoﬀ of making
use of existing information. So, B has an incentive to observe θB although it is costly and reveals
it truthfully. Therefore, σB = s.
Second, suppose that γ < φ. Then, σB = d. Here, it should be noted that, Bs strategy, which
is to imitate As action, is a dominant strategy not because information is costly to acquire, but
because the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the penalty. Recall that, although c = 0, if γ < φ,
she exhibits herding to avoid being penalized individually. In this case, it is obvious that B has no
incentive to acquire the costly information because, although the diﬀerent information is observed,
she will ignore it and exhibit herding.
5 p = 1
γ−φ
³
1
2
γ − 1
2
φ+ 1
2
p
−4cγ + 4cφ− 2γφ+ γ2 + φ2
´
and ÿp = 1
γ−φ
¡
γ + 1−√γ + φ− cγ + cφ+ γφ+ 1¢
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In addition, the procedure of deriving Proposition 2 and 3 yields that if B observes costly θB,
she always reveals it truthfully.
Corollary 1
Suppose that information is costly to acquire, i.e., c > 0. Then, the strategic distortion of the
acquired information, herding and anti-herding, does not occur.
This is an intuitive result. As information is costly to acquire, before making a decision as to
whether to observe θB, B compares the expected gain that will result from observing the costly θB
and the one from making use of θA. B observes θB only if the former is greater than the latter.
Hence, if she observes her costly signal, she has no incentive to neglect it regardless of θB. If she
had any incentive to neglect costly θB, she would have no reason to pay a cost in order to observe
it.
5 Discussion
5.1 Ex-post eﬃciency and information quality
Recall the given payoﬀ structure (P). According to it, the (ex-post) eﬃcient case, in which the
sum of both agents payoﬀs is maximized, depends on the values of the reward and the penalty.
If γ − φ > 2, the eﬃcient case is the situation in which one agent takes the correct action and
the other takes the wrong action. That is, the diﬀerent actions between agents is a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for eﬃciency. On the other hand, if γ − φ < 2, the case in which both agents
take the correct action is eﬃcient.
Consider the case where γ − φ > 2. When a signal is given exogenously to B, i.e., c = 0, if
p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢, B always takes a diﬀerent action from A by exhibiting anti-herding and if p ∈ (p∗, 1),
B reveals her signal truthfully. Hence, the eﬃciency can always be attained if p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢. If
p ∈ (p∗, 1), although there still exists a possibility that the eﬃcient outcome can be derived, it
cannot be guaranteed.6 Also, when c > 0, if p ∈ ¡12 , ÿp¢, B always takes an action diﬀerent from
that of A by deviating from As action without observing θB. Therefore, eﬃciency can always
be attained if p ∈ ¡12 , ÿp¢. If p ∈ (ÿp, p), according to θB, sometimes the eﬃcient outcome can be
attained and sometimes not. However, if p ∈ (p, 1), the eﬃcient outcome cannot be derived at all
because B always imitates As action.
Next, consider the case where γ − φ < 2. If 0 < γ − φ < 2, then it is necessary for both
agents actions to be the same to achieve eﬃciency because both agents should take the correct
action. Hence, what is sure is that if p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ when c = 0 and if p ∈ ¡12 , ÿp¢ when c > 0, the
eﬃcient outcome cannot be derived at all. On the other hand, if γ − φ < 0, B invariably takes the
same action as A regardless of c. Hence, although the eﬃcient outcome cannot be guaranteed, the
necessary condition is satisÞed.
6For example, if θA 6= θB , the outcome is eﬃcient.
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In brief, if the payoﬀ structure is strongly biased toward the reward, i.e., γ−φ > 2, the relatively
low quality of information is socially good because it makes an agent intend to be diﬀerentiated
from the other agent, which causes the eﬃcient outcome. Moreover, if information is costly to
acquire, a suﬃciently high quality of information is socially bad because it prevents the socially
eﬃcient case. If, on the other hand, the payoﬀ structure is weakly biased toward the reward, i.e.,
0 < γ−φ < 2, then relatively low quality of information is socially bad. In this case, for the eﬃcient
outcome to be derived, it is necessary that the agents quality of information should be suﬃciently
high or at least moderate.
Corollary 2
1) If the payoﬀ structure is strongly biased toward the reward, i.e., γ − φ > 2, a relatively low
quality of information is socially good. Moreover, if c > 0, a suﬃciently high quality of information
is socially bad.
2) If the payoﬀ structure is weakly biased toward the reward, i.e., 0 < γ−φ < 2, then a relatively
low quality of information is socially bad.
5.2 Application of the results
5.2.1 Diﬃcult task and easy task
The results derived in this model provide a reasoning that explains an agents strategic behavior
in regard to the degree of hardness of a given task. Suppose that a given task is evaluated as
being relatively easy. Then, although the outcome of the task is successful, only a small reward
will be given because the successful outcome is taken for granted. Alternately, if an agent fails a
task which is deemed to be relatively easy, then a large penalty will be given. However, if a given
task is evaluated as being diﬃcult, then, even though the outcome is unsuccessful, the penalty will
not be as large as for the easy task because less is expected of the agent. In addition, an agent
successfully completing a diﬃcult task will have a larger reward than for completing an easier task.
Therefore, if the task is evaluated as being relatively easy (hard), then the agent can evaluate her
situation as one in which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the penalty (reward). The results
of the model predict that there will be a high tendency for the same or similar action among the
agents involved in the easy task and a high tendency toward discrepancy in the actions among the
agents involved in the hard task.
5.2.2 Reputation
The above reasoning can also be used to describe the relationship between the agents strategic
behavior and her reputation. If an agents reputation is relatively low, then even if her action turns
out to be incorrect, the penalty will be small because not much is expected of her. However, a large
reward will be given to her if she is correct. That is, an agent with a low reputation would have
little to lose from taking a wrong action and much to gain from taking a correct action. On the
other hand, if an agent has a good reputation, then her correct action is more likely to be taken
13
for granted and she will receive a large penalty for taking a wrong action. Therefore, such an agent
would have much to lose from a wrong action and very little to gain from a correct action. The
Þrst case may correspond to a case in which the reward is greater than the penalty and the second
case may correspond to a case in which the penalty is greater than the reward. Then, this model
predicts that an agent with a low reputation is more likely to act diﬀerently than her peers and an
agent with a high reputation is more likely to act in accordance to her peers.
In Graham (1999), he conducts an empirical test for herding among investment newsletters. His
results show that a newsletter analyst herds more if her reputation is high. Also, according to Zitze-
witz (2001b), the empirical data on equity analysts earning forecast shows that agents exaggerate
more when they are underrated by their clients.7 These are the Þndings consistent with the above
reasoning. In addition, Chevalier and Ellison (1999) Þnds that younger managers deviate less from
the mean risk levels and sector weightings of funds in their objective class than older managers
and therefore have a higher tendency to herd. As younger managers are more likely to have low
reputations, this Þnding seems to be contradictory to what this model predicts. However, Cheva-
lier and Ellison (1999) also Þnds that the managerial termination is more performance-sensitive for
younger managers, which means that, for the same degree of unsatisfactory performance, younger
managers are more likely to be Þred than older managers. Therefore, younger managers are more
likely to interpret their situation as one in which the payoﬀ structure is biased toward the penalty.
Then, their Þnding is consistent with the results of this study, which state that there is a higher
tendency of similar actions in such a case.
5.3 Truthfulness in actions
Note that A and B are homogenous in that both players observe the signals with the same precision.
Hence, no ones information should have the priority. However, as proposed in current literature
and in this model, the sequential ordering of action can suppress the truthfulness of subsequent
player. In this sense, how to design the reward and the penalty to produce both players truthfulness
in actions when the timings of actions are sequential can be a meaningful question. Now we deÞne
the equilibrium in which both agents truthfulness in information revelation is guaranteed for all
parameter set of information quality.
DeÞnition 5 Truthful equilibrium
We say the equilibrium is truthful, if ai = θi can be "veriÞed" for ∀p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and i ∈ {A,B}
in equilibrium.
Note that both notions, a) ai = θi can be veriÞed and b) ai = θi is available, should be
diﬀerentiated. As θi is private information and only ai can be observed, truthfulness in action
cannot be veriÞed. Hence, the truthful equilibrium is deÞned as the one in which it is guaranteed
7 In Zitzewitz (2001b), the author explains that it is due to the agents incentive to increase the weighting of
future observations of her ability. However, in this model, we assert that this models reasoning, which is that the
underrated agents has nothing to lose for the wrong action and much to gain for the correct action, can be an
alternative explanation to the empirical Þnding of his article.
14
that both players have no incentive to deviate from θi endogenously. We have already checked that
A, who acts as the leader, always reveals her signal truthfully. Hence, whether or not both players
true signals can be revealed without distortion depends on whether B reveals θB truthfully or not.
In addition to our model, we can think about the role of the manager who hires both players and
assigns the reward and penalty as a contract to both players. Then, γ and φ can be interpreted as
control variables. In the following, we check whether it is possible to derive the truthful equilibrium
by controlling γ and φ. We assume that the manager does not know each players information
quality.8 What he knows are that p is drawn from uniform distribution deÞned over from 12 to
1 and both players are homogenous. Then, as the manager has no reason to give any priority to
anyones information, the case the most valuable to the manager will be the one where both players
truthfulness in actions can be induced for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
Now consider the case where θB is given to B exogenously, i.e., c = 0. According to Proposition
1, if γ < φ, the truthful equilibrium cannot be attained at all because B exhibits herding whenever
θB 6= aA. Therefore, in order to derive the truthful equilibrium, it is essential that the penalty
should not be greater than the reward. However, even when the reward is stressed more than the
penalty, Bs truthfulness in action is guaranteed only if p ∈ (p∗, 1). Here, as p∗ = p∗(γ, φ), we can
think about the eﬀects of the reward and the penalty on the critical value p∗. The comparative
statics yield the following result.
Corollary 3
Suppose that c = 0 and γ > φ. Then, ∂p
∗
∂γ > 0 and
∂p∗
∂φ < 0
Proof
In the appendix.
From Corollary 2, as γ decreases or φ increases, the parameter set of p in which B reveals
her signal truthfully increases. In other words, as γ increases or φ decreases, the parameter set
of p in which B exhibits anti-herding increases. The interesting point is that, while the penalty
cannot be greater than the reward in order to induce Bs truthfulness in action, if γ is stressed too
much, B has a too strong incentive to be diﬀerentiated from A, which yields excessive anti-herding.
What this proposes is that, in order to maximize the parameter set of p for which B reveals her
signal truthfully, the diﬀerence between γ and φ should be as small as possible. This argument
can also be veriÞed by the following. Note that if p ∈ (p∗, 1), B reveals her signal truthfully where
p∗ = 1γ−φ
¡
(γ + 1)−√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢. Then,
Pr (p ∈ (p∗, 1)) = 2 (γ − φ)− 2
¡
(γ + 1)−√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢
γ − φ (8)
8We want especially to consider the case where the ordering of action cannot be controlled by a manager. If a
manager can control the ordering of action, in order to derive the truthfulness in actions, it is best to make the agents
act simultaneously.
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The LHospitals theorem yields that,
lim
γ→φ+
Pr (p ∈ (p∗, 1)) = lim
φ→γ−
Pr (p ∈ (p∗, 1)) = φ+ 1q
(φ+ 1)2
= 1 (9)
Corollary 4
Suppose that c = 0. Then, there exist γ and φ such that the truthful equilibrium can be induced.
Next, consider the case where θB is costly to acquire, i.e., c > 0. From Proposition 2 and 3,
it can be veriÞed that, like the case in which c = 0, if γ < φ, the truthful equilibrium cannot
be attained at all. Therefore, in order to derive the truthful equilibrium, it is essential that the
penalty should not be greater than the reward. Although γ > φ, note that σB = s is derived only
if p ∈ (ÿp, p). Then, the problem of Þnding the optimal payoﬀ structure under which σB = s can be
described as follows:
Max
γ,φ
Ã
p (γ, φ, c)− ÿp (γ, φ, c)
1
2
!
(10)
=
2
γ − φ
µµ
1
2
γ − 1
2
φ+
1
2
q
−4cγ + 4cφ− 2γφ+ γ2 + φ2
¶
−
³
γ + 1−
p
γ + φ− cγ + cφ+ γφ+ 1
´¶
s.t. γ > φ and c <
(γ − φ) (φ+ 1) (γ + 1)
(γ + φ+ 2)2
For the highly nonlinear functional forms of the given problem, deriving the optimal payoﬀ structure
explicitly is demanding. Hence, in the following, we provide numerical examples. The following
two graphs, Figure 1 and Figure 2, show the eﬀects of the changes in γ and φ on the parameter set
in which σB = s for given c = 1 and c = 10 respectively. The graphs in each Þgure were derived
as follows. In Figure 1, the graph from the bottom to the top respectively corresponds to the case
where φ = 5, φ = 50, φ = 500, and φ = 1000 when c = 1. Also, in Figure 2, the graph from
the bottom to the top respectively corresponds to the case where φ = 100, φ = 500, φ = 1000,
and φ = 5000 when c = 10. Then, for each Þxed c and φ, the eﬀects of the change in γ, which
satisÞes both constraints, are checked. The X-axis describes the reward γ and Y-axis describes
Pr (σB = s).9
9Note that we assume pU
¡
1
2
, 1
¢
.
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Figure 1: The eﬀects of change in γ and φ on Pr (σB = s) when c = 1
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Figure 2: The eﬀects of change in γ and φ on Pr (σB = s) when c = 10
Some common observations from the above two Þgures can be described as follows.
1) For given c and φ, there exists γ¯ such that if φ < γ < γ¯, the increase in γ induces an increase
in Pr (σB = s) but if γ > γ¯, the increase in γ induces a decrease in Pr (σB = s) where γ¯ > φ.
2) For given c, as φ increases, γ¯ increases where γ¯ > φ.
3) For given c, as γ¯ and φ increase, the maximum value of Pr (σB = s) increases.
Compared to the case in which c = 0, the main diﬀerences are as follows. When c = 0,
Pr (σB = s) increases as γ − φ decreases where γ > φ. In other words, what matters is not the
absolute values of γ and φ, but the relative diﬀerence in both values, γ − φ. On the other hand,
if c > 0, the values of γ and φ matter. Also, when c = 0, as the diﬀerence between γ and φ
decreases and converges to 0, the truthful equilibrium can be attained. However, if c > 0, it can
be conjectured that γ¯ − φ¯ > 0 where γ¯ and φ¯ the optimal reward and penalty which attains the
maximum of Pr (σB = s) for given c. This is intuitive if we note that signal is costly to acquire. To
give an agent an incentive to observe a costly signal and distinguish herself, the reward for being
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the only agent who took the correct action should be relatively greater than that of the case where
c = 0.
In a related empirical study, Massa and Patgiri (2005) tests the corporate theory of the manage-
rial herding based on the reputational and the career concerns by using data from the mutual fund
industry. This data shows that a high incentive contract induces managers to take a strategy that
is the most likely to yield an extreme performance realization and therefore take more risks than
their peers by adopting trading strategies diﬀerent than those used by their peers. This Þnding is
consistent with the above discussion. When c = 0, the payoﬀ structure excessively biased toward
the reward induces the excessive anti-herding. When c > 0, for given c and φ, the excessively high
reward decreases Pr (σB = s), which is certainly due to Bs deviation from As action.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have explored how asymmetry in the reward and penalty as well as costly infor-
mation aﬀects an agents strategic behavior in regard to her information acquisition and revelation.
If the penalty is greater than the reward, then an agent focuses only on avoiding the penalty. Hence,
regardless of whether information is costly to acquire, she will take the same action as the other
agent in order to share the penalty, if incurred. On the other hand, if the reward is greater than
the penalty, the agent has an incentive to act diﬀerently than her peers to be diﬀerentiated. If a
signal is also given exogenously to the follower, parameter sets of information quality for which she
exhibits anti-herding and truthfulness exist. However, the truthful equilibrium, in which agents
truthfulness can be veriÞed endogenously for the whole parameter set of information quality, can
be induced by managing the reward and the penalty. If it is costly for the follower to acquire a
signal, then parameter sets of information quality for which she exhibits imitation, deviation and
truthfulness exist. In particular, if costly information is observed then it is revealed truthfully.
Hence, in that situation, providing the payoﬀ structure under which an agent observes her costly
signal is important if we want to induce her truthfulness in action.
To focus our attention and deliver the main message in a clear manner, we conÞne our analysis
into a simple environment. Hence there are some possible extensions of the present analysis. For
example, we can consider a situation in which players information qualities are private information
and therefore their types matter. Another possibility is to consider the case in which the quality of
information depends on the cost paid to acquire. That is, we can assume a case in which more precise
information can be attained as she pays more. Finally, when we posit information that is costly
to acquire, for the highly nonlinear functional form of critical values of information quality, we did
not derive the optimal payoﬀ structure explicitly which maximizes the parameter set of information
quality for which the followers truthfulness in action is guaranteed endogenously. Analyzing this
part more in detail, including the case where agents information qualities are heterogeneous, will
be a meaningful extension of the analysis completed here. These awaits the future work.
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7 Proof
7.1 Proof of Proposition 1
7.1.1 STEP 1: Deriving Bs best response as the follower
Because c = 0, B can always observe θB. Also, she observes the leaders action aA before taking
her own action. However, due to the lack of the opportunity to observe As true signal θA, she does
not know whether aA is truthful or not. Thus her best response as the follower depends on her
belief in the truthfulness of As action. In following, EπB(aB = θB) denotes Bs expected payoﬀ
when she reveals her signal truthfully and EπB(aB 6= θB) denotes the one when she deviates from
her signal.
Case 1) When B believes As action is truthful
In this case, Bs expected payoﬀ is calculated from EπB(aB = θB) =
P
w Pr(w| θA, θB)πB(aB =
θB, aA = θA) and EπB(aB 6= θB) =
P
w Pr(w| θA, θB)πB(aB 6= θB, aA = θA). In the subgame, B
can face either θB = aA or θB 6= aA. First, without loss of generality, assume that θB = aA = h.
As B believes that As action is truthful, B expects that θA = h. Then, from Pr(w = H|hA, hB) =
p2
2p2−2p+1 and Pr(w = L|hi, hj) = (1−p)
2
2p2−2p+1 , EπB(aB = θB) =
2p−1
2p2−2p+1 and EπB(aB 6= θB) =
(1−p)2γ−p2φ
2p2−2p+1 . Then,
EπB(aB = θB)− EπB(aB 6= θB) = (φ− γ)p
2 + 2(1 + γ)p− (1 + γ)
(2p2 − 2p+ 1) (A1)
Here, the denominator
¡
2p2 − 2p+ 1¢ > 0 for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ . Now, if we let f(p) ≡ (φ − γ)p2 +
2(1 + γ)p − (1 + γ), whether EπB(aB = θB) T EπB(aB 6= θB) depends on f(p) T 0. First,
assume that γ < φ. Then, f(p) = (φ − γ)p2 + (2p − 1)(1 + γ) > 0 for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ . So always
EπB(aB = θB) > EπB(aB 6= θB). Second, assume that γ > φ. In this case, we can check
followings: 1) f(p) is a strictly concave function, 2) It attains the max at p = 2(1+γ)2(γ−φ) > 1 where
f
³
2(1+γ)
2(γ−φ)
´
= (φ+1)(γ+1)(γ−φ) > 0, 3) f
¡
1
2
¢
= φ−γ4 < 0, and 4) f(1) = 1+φ > 0. Then, for p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
, f(p)
is a monotone increasing function, which means that there exists p∗ ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ such that if p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ ,
f(p) < 0 and if p ∈ (p∗, 1), f(p) > 0. That is, if p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ , EπB(aB = θB) < EπB(aB 6= θB) and
if p ∈ (p∗, 1), EπB(aB = θB) > EπB(aB 6= θB) where p∗ = 1γ−φ
¡
γ + 1−√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢ .
Lemma A.1
Suppose that B believes that As action is truthful and θB = aA.
1) If γ > φ, there exists a critical value p∗ ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ such that if p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ , she exhibits
anti-herding and if p ∈ (p∗, 1) , she reveals her signal truthfully.
2) If γ < φ, she reveals her signal truthfully for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
Here, p∗ = 1γ−φ
¡
(γ + 1)−√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢
Second, without loss of generality, assume that θB = l 6= aA = h. Then, from Pr(w = H|hA, lB) =
Pr(w = L|hA, lB) = 12 , EπB(aB = θB) = γ−φ2 and EπB(aB 6= θB) = 0. Then, the following result
is easily derived.
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Lemma A.2
Suppose that B believes that As action is truthful and θB 6= aA.
1) If γ > φ, B reveals her signal truthfully for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
2) if γ < φ, B exhibits herding for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
Case 2) When B believes that As action is not truthful
In this case, Bs expected payoﬀ is calculated from EπB(aB = θB) =
P
w Pr(w| θA, θB)πj(aB =
θB, aA 6= θA) and EπB(aB 6= θB) =
P
w Pr(w| θA, θB)πj(aB 6= θB, aA 6= θA). First, without
loss of generality, assume that θB = aA = h. In this case, B believes that θA = l. Then, from
Pr(w = H| lA, hB) = Pr(w = L| lA, hB) = 12 , EπB(aB = θB) = 0 and EπB(aB 6= θB) = γ−φ2 .
Then, the following result is derived easily.
Lemma A.3
Suppose that B believes that As action is not truthful and aA = θB.
1) If γ > φ, B exhibits anti-herding for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
2) If γ < φ, B reveals her signal truthfully for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
Second, without loss of generality, assume that θB = h 6= aA = l. In this case, B believes that
As true signal is θA = h. Then, from Pr(w = H|hA, hB) = p22p2−2p+1 and Pr(w = L|hA, hB) =
(1−p)2
2p2−2p+1 , EπB(aB = θB) =
p2(γ−φ)+2pφ−φ
(2p2−2p+1) and EπB(aB 6= θB) = − (2p−1)(2p2−2p+1) , which yields that
EπB(aB = θB)−EπB(aB 6= θB) = p
2 (γ − φ) + p (2φ+ 2)− φ− 1
(2p2 − 2p+ 1) (A2)
We have already checked that 2p2 − 2p + 1 > 0 for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ . Hence, if we denote k (p) ≡
p2 (γ − φ) + p (2φ+ 2) − φ − 1, EπB(aB = θB) ≷ EπB(aB 6= θB) depends on k (p) ≷ 0. First,
assume that γ > φ. Then we can check the following points: 1) k (p) is a convex function, 2)
k (0) < 0, 3) k (1) > 0, and 4) k
¡
1
2
¢
> 0. So for p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ , f(p) is monotone increasing and
k (p) > 0 for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢. Hence, EπB(aB = θB) > EπB(aB 6= θB) for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢. Second, assume
that γ < φ. Then we can check the following points: 1) k (p) is a concave function, 2) k (0) < 0,
3) k (1) > 0, and 4) k
¡
1
2
¢
< 0. So for p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ , f(p) is monotone increasing and there exists
p ∈ ¡12 .1¢ such that if p ∈ ¡12 , p¢ , k (p) < 0 and if p ∈ (p, 1) , k (p) > 0. In other words, if p ∈ ¡12 , p¢ ,
EπB(aB = θB) < EπB(aB 6= θB) and if p ∈ (p, 1) , EπB(aB = θB) > EπB(aB 6= θB) where
p = 1φ−γ
¡
φ+ 1 +
√
γ + φ+ γφ+ 1
¢
.
Lemma A.4
Suppose that B believes that As action is not truthful and aA 6= θB.
1) Suppose γ > φ. Then, B reveals her signal truthfully for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢.
2) Suppose γ < φ. Then there exists p such that if p ∈ ¡12 , p¢ , B exhibits herding and if
p ∈ (p, 1) , she reveals her signal truthfully.
Here, p = 1φ−γ
¡
φ+ 1 +
√
γ + φ+ γφ+ 1
¢
.
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7.1.2 STEP 2: Deriving As best response as the leader
Now, using backward induction, we derive As best response. Because A acts as the leader, she
has no chance to observe θB before taking her action. Therefore, As posterior belief should be
about the true state and B s true signal, Pr(w, θB| θA). Also, she does not know what As belief
will be about the truthfulness of aA. Thus, As best response should be derived according to As
expectation for B s belief in the truthfulness of As action. In following, EπA (aA = θA) denotes
the expected payoﬀ when A reveals her signal truthfully and EπA (aA 6= θA) denotes the one when
she deviates from her signal. In this case, EπA (aA = θA) =
P
w
P
θB
Pr(w, θB| θA)πA (aA = θA, ·)
and EπA (aA 6= θA) =
P
w
P
θB
Pr(w, θB| θA)πA (aA 6= θA, ·).
Case 1) When A expects that B believes that As action is truthful
Recall Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2. First, consider the case where γ > φ. If p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢, A
knows that aA 6= aB because B takes the diﬀerent action from aA always. Then, EπA (aA = θA) =
(pγ − φ+ pφ) and EπA (aA 6= θA) = − (pγ − γ + pφ). Then,
EπA (aA = θA)−EπA (aA 6= θA) = (γ + φ) (2p− 1) > 0 (A3)
If p ∈ (p∗, 1), A knows that B reveals her signal truthfully always. Then, EπA (aA = θA) =
p2 (φ− γ) + p (γ − φ+ 2)− 1 and EπA (aA 6= θA) = p2 (γ − φ)− 2pγ + γ. Hence,
EπA (aA = θA)−EπA (aA 6= θA) = (2p− 1) (γ − pγ + pφ+ 1) > 0 (A4)
Second, consider the case where γ < φ. Then, from Lemma A.1 and A.2, Bs best response as the
follower is as follows: If θB = aA, B reveals her signal truthfully for ∀p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
and if θB 6= aA, B
exhibits herding for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢. That is, B takes the same action as A always. Then,
EπA (aA = θA) = (2p− 1) > − (2p− 1) = EπA (aA 6= θA) (A5)
Case 2) When A expects that B believes As action is not truthful
First, consider the case where γ > φ. Recall Lemma A.3 and Lemma A.4 which yields that B
takes the diﬀerent action from A always. In this case, it was already checked that As best response
is to reveal her signal truthfully. Second, consider the case where γ < φ. Recall Lemma A.3 and
Lemma A.4 which states the following: 1) Suppose θj = ai. Then she reveals her signal truthfully
for ∀p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ . 2) Suppose θj 6= ai. Then there exists p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ such that if p ∈ ¡12 , p¢ , j exhibits
herding and if p ∈ (p, 1) , she reveals her signal truthfully. Now, if p ∈ ¡12 , p¢ , A knows that B
takes the same action as her always. Also, if p ∈ (p, 1) , A knows that B reveals her signal truthfully
always. In Case 1), it was already checked that, for both cases, As best response is to reveal her
signal truthfully.
Finally, from Case 1) and Case 2), As best response is to reveal her signal truthfully always
regardless of Bs belief.
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Lemma A.5
As best response as the leader is to always reveal her signal truthfully.
Then, from A.5, B assigns a zero probability to the possibility that A deviates from θA. There-
fore, the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be characterized as Proposition 1.
7.2 Proof of Proposition 2 and 3
In following, Eπi(ai = θi) denotes i s expected payoﬀ when she reveals her signal truthfully and
Eπi(ai 6= θi) denotes the one when she deviates from her observed signal. For B, if she does not
observe her signal, EπB(aB = aA) denotes the expected payoﬀ when she imitates As action and
EπB(aB 6= aA) denotes the one when she deviates from As action.
7.2.1 STEP 1: Deriving Bs best response as the follower
CASE 1: When B believes that As action is truthful
Suppose that B believes As action is truthful. Then, for given aA, she must decide whether to
observe her costly signal θB. If she observes θB, the situation can be either θB = aA or θB 6= aA.
If she does not observe θB, she should take an action based on θA inferred from aA according to
her belief for the truthfulness of aA.
First, we assume that B observes her costly signal. Then, her best response is same as that of
the case where θB is given to her exogenously. Thus, her best response of this case is Lemma A.1
and A.2.
Second, suppose that B does not observe her signal. Then, she should make use of θA inferred
from observing aA. Assume that aA = h. Then, B should decide whether to imitate or deviate from
aA based on the posterior belief Pr(w | θA) where she believes aA = θA. Then, from EπB(aB =
aA) = 2p− 1 and EπB(aB 6= aA) = −pφ+ (1− p)γ,
EπB(aB = aA)−EπB(aB 6= aA) = p(2 + γ + φ)− (1 + γ) (A6)
So, if p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
, EπB(aB = aA) > EπB(aB 6= aA) and if p ∈
³
1
2 ,
1+γ
2+γ+φ
´
, EπB(aB =
aA) < EπB(aB 6= aA). Here, it can be checked that 1+γ2+γ+φ < 1 for p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. However,
if γ > φ, 1+γ2+γ+φ >
1
2 and if γ < φ,
1+γ
2+γ+φ <
1
2 . Therefore, when γ > φ, if p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
,
EπB(aB = aA) > EπB(aB 6= aA) and if p ∈
³
1
2 ,
1+γ
2+γ+φ
´
, EπB(aB = aA) < EπB(aB 6= aA).
However, if γ < φ, EπB(aB = aA) > EπB(aB 6= aA) for ∀p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
Lemma A.6
Suppose that B does not observe her signal θB when she believes aA = θA.
1) Suppose γ > φ. If p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
, she imitates As action and if p ∈
³
1
2 ,
1+γ
2+γ+φ
´
, she
deviates from As action.
2) Suppose γ < φ. Then she imitates As action always.
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Now, using the above results, Lemma A.1, A.2 and A.6, we derive B s strategic decision in
regards to observing her costly signal and being truthful in revelation. It should be noted that,
when B considers observing her costly signal, she does not know which signal θB ∈ {h, l} will be
observed. Thus, the posterior belief should be Pr(w, θB| θA).
1) When γ > φ
If we consider the case where γ > φ, Bs best response as the follower varies according to
whether p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ , p ∈ ³p∗, 1+γ2+γ+φ´ , and p ∈ ³ 1+γ2+γ+φ , 1´.
Case 1-1) When p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
If p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
, the available strategy to B is to imitate aA without observing θB or reveals
to observe θB truthfully after observing θB. Then
EπB(aB = θB) =
X
w
X
θB
Pr(w, θB| θA)πB(·) = p2 (φ− γ) + p (γ − φ+ 2)− 1− c (A7)
EπB(aB = aA) =
X
w
Pr(w| θA)πB(·) = 2p− 1 (A8)
So,
EπB(aB = θB)−EπB(aB = aA) = −p2 (γ − φ) + p (γ − φ)− c (A9)
We denote h(p) ≡ −p2 (γ − φ) + p (γ − φ)− c. Then, the following points can be checked: 1) h(p)
is a strictly concave function and it attains the maximum value at p = 12 , 2) h(0) = −c < 0, 3)
h(1) = −c < 0, 4) h ¡12¢ = 14 (γ − φ) − c, and 5) h³ 1+γ2+γ+φ´ = (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)(γ+φ+2)2 − c. From 4), if
c > γ−φ4 , h
¡
1
2
¢
< 0. Then, for all p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
, EπB(aB = θB) < EπB(aB = aA). On the other
hand, if c < γ−φ4 , h
¡
1
2
¢
> 0. Then, as h(p) is a monotone decreasing function for p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
,
h
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ
´
≷ 0 decides h(p) ≷ 0. If (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
< c, h(p) < 0 for all p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
. If
(γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
> c, there exists p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ such that if p ∈ ³ 1+γ2+γ+φ , p´, h(p) > 0 and if p ∈ (p, 1),
h(p) < 0. Here, note that γ−φ4 >
(φ+1)(γ−φ)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
. Hence, the above can be summarized as follows: If
c > (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
, EπB(aB = θB) < EπB(aB = aA) for ∀p ∈
¡
1
2 , 1
¢
. If c < (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
, there
exists p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ such that if p ∈ ³ 1+γ2+γ+φ , p´ , EπB(aB = θB) > EπB(aB = aA) and if p ∈ (p, 1) ,
EπB(aB = θB) < EπB(aB = aA). Here, p = 1γ−φ
³
1
2γ − 12φ+ 12
p
−4cγ + 4cφ− 2γφ+ γ2 + φ2
´
.
Lemma A.7
Suppose that γ > φ and p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
.
1) Suppose c > (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
. Then, B deviates from As action without observing her signal.
2) Suppose c < (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
. Then there exists p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
such that if p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , p
´
,
B observes her signal and reveals it truthfully and if p ∈ (p, 1) , B imitates As action without
observing her signal.
Here, p = 1γ−φ
³
1
2γ − 12φ+ 12
p
−4cγ + 4cφ− 2γφ+ γ2 + φ2
´
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Case 1-2) When p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢
If p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢, the strategy which B considers is either to observe her signal or to deviate from
the leaders action without observing her signal. Her best response in this case can be derived
easily from the following reasoning. Suppose that she observes her signal. In this case, if θB = aA,
then she exhibits anti-herding and if θB 6= aA, she reveals her signal truthfully. Thus, it is derived
that aB 6= aA. Also, if she does not observe her signal, she deviates from As action, which yields
that aB 6= aA. That is, whether or not she observes her signal, always it is induced that aB 6= aA.
Then, it is obvious that B has no incentive to observe her costly signal. Thus, in this case, her best
response is to deviate from As action without observing θB.
Lemma A.8
Suppose that γ > φ and p ∈ ¡12 , p∗¢ . Then, B deviates from As action without observing her
signal.
Case 1-3) When p ∈
³
p∗, 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
In this case, the strategy which B considers is either to observe θB and reveals it truthfully or
to deviate from As action without observing θB. Then,
EπB [aB = θB] =
X
w
X
θB
Pr(w, θB| θA)πB(aB = θB, ·) (A10)
= p2 (φ− γ) + p (γ − φ+ 2)− 1− c (1)
EπB [aB 6= aA] =
X
w
Pr(w| θA)πB(aB 6= aA, ·) = γ − p (γ + φ) (A11)
Then,
EπB(aB = θB)−EπB(aB 6= aA) = p2 (φ− γ) + p (2γ + 2)− c− γ − 1 (A12)
We denote g (p) ≡ p2 (φ− γ)+ p (2γ + 2)− c− γ− 1. Then, followings can be checked. 1) g (p) is a
strictly concave function. 2) g (p) attains the maximized value at p = 2γ+22γ−2φ > 1, 3) g (p = 0) < 0,
4) g
¡
p = 12
¢
< 0, and 5) g (p = p∗) < 0. Now consider the value of g
³
p = 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
. It can be
checked that, if c > (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
, g (p) < 0 and if c < (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
, g
³
p = 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
> 0.
Hence, if c > (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
, EπB(aB = θB) < EπB(aB 6= aA) for ∀p ∈
³
p∗, 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
. Also, if c <
(γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
, there exists ÿp such that if p ∈ (p∗, ÿp) , EπB(aB = θB) < EπB(aB 6= aA) and if p ∈³
ÿp, 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
, EπB(aB = θB) > EπB(aB 6= aA). Here, ÿp = 1γ−φ
¡
γ + 1−√γ + φ− cγ + cφ+ γφ+ 1¢ .
Lemma A.9
Suppose that γ > φ and p ∈
³
p∗, 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
.
1) Suppose c > (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
. Then, B deviates from As action without observing θB.
2) Suppose c < (γ−φ)(φ+1)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
. Then, there exists ÿp ∈
³
p∗, 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
such that if p ∈ (p∗, ÿp) ,
B deviates from aA without observing θB and if p ∈
³
ÿp, 1+γ2+γ+φ
´
, B observes θB and reveals it
truthfully.
Here, ÿp = 1γ−φ
¡
γ + 1−√γ + φ− cγ + cφ+ γφ+ 1¢
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Then, Lemma A.7, A.8 and A.9 yield the following result.
Lemma A.10
Suppose γ > φ and B believes that aA = θA.
1) Suppose c > (φ+1)(γ−φ)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
. If p ∈
³
1+γ
2+γ+φ , 1
´
, B imitates As action without observing her
signal and if p ∈
³
1
2 ,
1+γ
2+γ+φ
´
, she deviates from As action without observing her signal.
2) Suppose 0 < c < (φ+1)(γ−φ)(γ+1)
(γ+φ+2)2
. If p ∈ ¡12 , ÿp¢ , B deviates from As action without observing
her signal, if p ∈ (ÿp, p) , she observes her costly signal and reveals it truthfully, and if p ∈ (p, 1) ,
she imitates As action without observing her signal.
2) When γ < φ
Suppose γ < φ. Then, B s best response can be derived easily from following reasoning. When
B observes θB, if aA = θB, B reveals her signal truthfully and if aA 6= θB, she exhibits herding.
Also if B does not observe θB, B imitates As action always. Thus, whether or not she observes her
costly signal, it is derived that aA = aB. Therefore, B has no incentive to observe her costly signal.
Lemma A.11
Suppose that γ < φ and j believes that ai = θi. Then, j always imitates is action without
observing her signal.
CASE 2: When B believes that As action is not truthful
The procedure through which we derive Bs best response when she believes that As action
is not truthful is analogous with those used for Lemma A.10 and A.11. Also, below, it is shown
that As best response is always to reveal θA truthfully. Hence, the detailed procedure of proof is
skipped.
Lemma A.12
Suppose that B believes aA 6= θA.
1) Suppose γ > φ. Then, B deviates from As action without observing her signal for ∀p ∈¡
1
2 , 1
¢
.
2) Suppose γ < φ. Then, if p ∈
³
1
2 ,
φ+1
γ+φ+2
´
, B imitates As action without θB and if p ∈³
φ+1
γ+φ+2 , 1
´
, she deviates from As action without observing θB.
7.2.2 STEP 2: Deriving As best response as the leader
By assumption, θA is given exogenously to A. Thus, the strategy which A considers is either to
reveal θA truthfully or not. Note that, Bs belief about the truthfulness in As action aﬀects Bs best
response as the follower. However, Bs Þnalized action is to imitate As action, deviate from As
action without observing θB or reveal θB truthfully after observing it. In following, EπA (aA = θA)
denotes As expected payoﬀ when A reveals her signal truthfully and EπA (aA 6= θA) denotes the
one when she deviates from her signal. Also, note that, if A expects that B makes use of θA without
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observing θB, the posterior belief should be Pr(w| θA). On the other hand, if A expects that B
observes θB, the posterior belief should be Pr(w, θB| θA).
Consider the case where A expects that B imitates aA without observing θB. Then, for given
θA, under Pr(w| θA),
EπA (aA = θA) = 2p− 1 > − (2p− 1) = EπA (aA 6= θA) (A13)
Consider the case where A expects that B deviates from aA without observing θB. Then, for
given θA, under Pr(w| θA), EπA (aA = θA) = (pγ − φ+ pφ) and EπA (aA 6= θA) = − (pγ − γ + pφ).
Hence,
EπA (aA = θA)−EπA (aA 6= θA) = (γ + φ) (2p− 1) > 0 (A14)
Consider the case where A expects that B observes θB and reveals it truthfully. Then, for given
θA, under Pr(w, θB| θA), EπA (aA = θA) =
¡
2p+ pγ − pφ− p2γ + p2φ− 1¢ and EπA (aA 6= θA) =
− ¡2pγ − γ − p2γ + p2φ¢. Hence,
EπA (aA = θA)−EπA (aA 6= θA) = (2p− 1) (γ − pγ + pφ+ 1) > 0 (A15)
Finally, for all cases, As best response as the leader is to reveal her signal truthfully. Moreover,
this holds for all p ∈ ¡12 , 1¢ , γ > 1 and φ > 1. Therefore, regardless of B s belief in the truthfulness
of As action, As best response as the leader is to reveal θA truthfully.
Lemma A.13
As best response is to reveal θA truthfully.
Then, from Lemma 13, in the subgame, B assigns a zero probability to the possibility that
A deviates from θA. Therefore, the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium can be characterized as
Proposition 3 and 4.
7.3 Proof of Corollary 3
This can be proved if following can be checked: ∂p
∗
∂γ > 0 and
∂p∗
∂φ < 0. Note that
p∗ =
1
γ − φ
³
(γ + 1)−
p
γ + φ+ γφ+ 1
´
(A16)
Then,
∂p∗
∂γ
=
(φ+ 1)
¡
γ + φ+ 2− 2√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢
2 (φ− γ)2√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1 (A17)
Here, (γ + φ+ 2)2−¡2√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢2 = (φ− γ)2 > 0 where γ+φ+2 > 0 and 2√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1 >
0. Thus, γ + φ+ 2 > 2
√
γ + φ+ γφ+ 1, which yields ∂p
∗
∂γ > 0. Also
∂p∗
∂φ
= −(γ + 1)
¡
γ + φ+ 2− 2√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1¢
2 (φ− γ)2√γ + φ+ γφ+ 1 < 0 (A18)
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Thus, ∂p
∗
∂φ < 0.
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